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Abstract
Climate change scholars generally urge that CO
2
 emissions need to be cut 
rapidly if we are to avoid dangerous risks of climate change. However, 
climate change mitigation policies are widely perceived to have regres-
sive effects – that is, putting a higher financial burden as a proportion of 
household income on poor than on rich households. This is one of several 
major barriers to the adoption of effective mitigation policies. They would 
also have considerable social justice implications requiring significant 
welfare state responses. We assess the claim that climate change policies 
have regressive effects by comparing different types of mitigation poli-
cies. We will argue that many of these are indeed likely to have regressive 
distributional implications but that there are several policy options to 
counteract regressive effects.
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Introduction
There is long-standing interest in the distributional effects of climate 
change mitigation policies in the literatures on climate and energy 
policy, and economics. Hitherto, though, this debate has not impacted 
much on mainstream social policy debates (however, see Gough et al., 
2008). This needs to change because climate policy will have an imme-
diate impact on social policy through various channels, in particular 
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redistribution effects. Those effects are important for two reasons. First 
of all, they raise questions about fairness. For instance, how do the bur-
dens of climate change mitigation policy on citizens relate to household 
income? Are such burdens proportional to the impact on the environ-
ment of different lifestyles? And how can climate change policies be 
designed such that unjust distributional effects are avoided? Secondly, 
the public acceptability of such policies will influence the likelihood 
that governments adopt them. Little empirical research has been done 
in this area so far but it seems plausible that the (perceived) fairness 
of those policies will play an important role for public acceptability 
(Bristow et al., 2010). The potential power of adverse public reactions 
to policies is evident in the UK, for example, in the abandonment of the 
poll tax and more recently the fuel tax escalator. This does not neces-
sarily imply that governments will adopt policies which are fairest and/
or most accepted by the broader public. Existing power asymmetries 
in society and politics mean that governments frequently respond to 
considerable pressure from corporate interests to adopt designs favour-
able to them as evidenced in relation to the European Union Emissions 
Trading scheme (Michaelowa and Butzengeiger, 2005). However, the 
fairness of climate change mitigation policies remains important from 
a normative point of view and their public acceptability will be one 
of several factors that governments take into account in the course 
of policy-making as, for example, DEFRA’s recent research into the 
public acceptability of a Personal Carbon Trading scheme illustrates 
(DEFRA, 2008b).
This article1 analyses arguments and evidence concerning regarding 
the distributional impacts of a range of climate change mitigation poli-
cies. We will conclude that a range of currently debated and applied 
economic policy tools to mitigate climate change are likely to have 
regressive effects, meaning that households in lower income brackets 
bear a (considerably) higher burden of the cost as a percentage of their 
income than those in higher brackets.
However, we shall argue that the distributional effects of climate 
change mitigation policies will depend to a large extent on their exact 
design and on the area of emissions that they target (for example, emis-
sions from home energy use as opposed to emissions from transport). 
As we are particularly interested in the question of how regressive 
effects of emissions reduction policies can be avoided for reasons that 
we explained above, we will compare different policy options that can 
be used to mitigate or at least limit those effects.
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This article focuses on ‘economic instruments’ rather than ‘pure’ 
regulation because they are generally regarded as more ‘efficient’ in 
the literature on climate change mitigation (see section below). How-
ever, it needs to be stressed here that so-called ‘market-based’ climate 
change mitigation policies which define an overall cap on emissions for 
the economy (on any scale, e.g. nationally or globally) impose a strict 
‘straitjacket’ on the market, in effect creating a highly regulated type of 
market. This does not mean that there are no ethical concerns in rela-
tion to economic emission reduction instruments. One common point 
of contention is that economic instruments put a price on a commons – 
‘propertizing’ the earth’s atmosphere. Another is that some rich people 
will be able to maintain their high carbon lifestyles as they are able to 
pay a higher price for their consumption. However, within schemes that 
set a strict overall cap on emissions this will not be possible for the gen-
erality of the rich. This is because the bulk of emission reductions would 
need to be based on a cutback of their consumption, which is currently 
responsible for the high emission levels of rich countries. In short, we 
acknowledge considerable ethical concerns about, and potential short-
comings of, market-based mitigation policies. However, we find it 
plausible that they form a part of any viable plan to avoid dangerous 
climate change, since emissions cannot be regulated away overnight.
The first section of this article provides a brief overview of different 
types of economic mitigation policies. The second section summarizes 
the findings regarding the distributional effects of different types of 
mitigation policies. Here we will focus on emission and energy taxes 
and different types of cap and trade schemes. We will also discuss the 
impact that different methodological choices have on study results. The 
third section describes the different policy options for using revenues 
stemming from mitigation policies, and their distributional effects. 
The fourth section discusses the distributional impact of mitigation 
policies across a wider range of socio-economic factors. The conclusion 
summarizes the findings and identifies points for further discussion.
Types of mitigation policies
Mitigation policies can take a variety of forms, with different advan-
tages and disadvantages [...] from environmental, economic and distri-
butional perspectives. Generally, one can distinguish regulation, taxes 
or charges, subsidies and trading schemes (Helm, 2005; OECD, 1994). 
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Regulatory instruments set legally binding emission, energy use or 
efficiency targets which all addressees have to adhere to – or otherwise 
face financial and possibly penal penalties. It is frequently argued that 
regulation is less cost-efficient than market-based instruments because 
it does not reflect differing abatement costs of the various polluters. 
That is, it does not exploit the fact that some entities will be able to 
make large emissions savings at relatively low cost whilst others will 
find it very difficult and costly to adjust to lower emission targets.
This is one reason why economic instruments – which include vari-
ous regulatory aspects – have gained prominence in the literature on 
environmental policy.2 These instruments essentially use price incen-
tives and market mechanisms to generate environmentally beneficial 
behaviour.
The two main alternative market-based tools are carbon taxes and 
cap and trade schemes which both put a price on energy use or green-
house gas emissions in order to include ‘negative externalities’ result-
ing from economic activities (e.g. pollution) in the pricing mechanism. 
In theory, both schemes create financial incentives to switch to low-
impact lifestyles and production methods. The key difference between 
the two is that environmental taxes – in economics named ‘Pigovian 
taxes’ – establish a fixed price for environmentally damaging behav-
iours, whereas cap and trade fixes the amount of pollution by establish-
ing an emissions cap.
Environmental taxes are therefore believed to enhance economic 
security, but at the expense of environmental security, because the 
environmental improvement depends on actors’ responses to the tax. 
The opposite holds true for cap and trade schemes which fix the maxi-
mum amount of pollution but let the market set the price. Consider 
petrol for cars, for example. Both instruments would influence the price 
of petrol. In the case of a tax, a fixed charge is added to the ‘regular’ 
price of every litre of petrol, whilst the additional cost under a cap and 
trade scheme depends on the emissions cap and the overall demand for 
petrol. With the cap it is certain that only the amount of petrol associ-
ated with the allowed pollution target is sold in the economy, whilst 
the amount of petrol sold under a fuel or carbon tax may still increase 
if consumers are prepared to pay a higher price.
Mitigation instruments can apply at different levels of economic 
activity: up-, mid- or downstream in the chain of production running 
from natural resource extraction down to the end user. An upstream 
scheme would apply a tax or emissions cap to the production or import 
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of fossil fuels into the economy, thus achieving broadest coverage 
whilst minimizing the number of actors included in the scheme and the 
related administrative costs. Examples are the proposals for upstream 
carbon taxes (Hansen, 2009), Cap and Dividend (Barnes, 2003), Cap 
and Share (AEA and Cambridge Econometrics, 2008; FEASTA, 2008) 
or the Kyoto2 scheme (Tickell, 2008). A mid-stream scheme would 
apply to companies in specific economic sectors; the largest existing 
cap scheme, the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
is an example. Downstream schemes apply to individuals, and in some 
variants businesses, who would have carbon accounts and trade permits 
themselves (DEFRA, 2008a; Fleming, 2007).
Within cap and trade schemes, several options exist as to how emis-
sion permits are allocated to the participants – all of which have dif-
ferent distributional impacts. Initial emission budgets can be allocated 
to the participants in the scheme free of charge, through auctioning, 
or through a mix. For example, in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), emission permits have largely been given 
away for free to companies in the participating sectors, depending on 
their previous and estimated future emissions. This approach is called 
‘grandfathering’ in the literature. It is widely believed that this type 
of ‘grandfathering’ leads to windfall profits for companies as they can 
pass the additional costs on to customers or sell a considerable volume 
of their allocated permits. In other words, ‘grandfathering’ is likely to 
have regressive effects (Shammin and Bullard, 2009; Sijm et al., 2006). 
In contrast, auctioning the permits makes the polluters pay whilst the 
distributional effects depend on the capabilities of the targeted indus-
tries to pass on the cost to the consumer and the availability of alterna-
tives to these goods for consumers. Furthermore, auctioning emission 
permits to the participants creates a revenue stream for the government 
or organization that issues the permits. We will discuss below how 
those revenues can be used to counter-balance possible regressive effects 
of mitigation policies.
Distributional effects
Regressivity is a general feature of taxes on consumption, and therefore 
one would expect carbon taxes to be regressive. This expectation also 
carries through to various types of cap and trade schemes. Overall, the 
literature on the distributional effects of mitigation policies confirms 
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this prior view (Dresner and Ekins, 2006; Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009; 
Parry, 2004; Serret and Johnstone, 2006, to name but a few). However, 
this statement needs to be qualified as there are a range of exceptions 
to this rule depending on the source of pollution that is targeted, the 
methods applied in estimating distributional effects and, most impor-
tantly, how the revenue arising from the policy is used.
There is a general consensus that downstream taxses on home 
energy use are regressive if the revenue from those taxes or charges is 
not redistributed to the citizens (see Figure 1) (Baranzini et al., 2000; 
Barker and Köhler, 1998; Dresner and Ekins, 2006). The effects of such 
taxes, covering electricity and heating fuels, are particularly regressive 
because home energy use is relatively evenly distributed across income 
deciles (at least in industrialized countries).3 This means that low income 
households spend much higher shares of their income on home energy 
than richer households (Dresner and Ekins, 2006; Druckman and 
Jackson, 2008; Wier et al., 2005).
Schemes that put a price on carbon emissions further upstream, for 
example through a carbon tax or a cap and trade scheme that applies 


























Figure 1 Estimated distributional effect of a carbon tax on home energy use of UK 
households
Based on Dresner and Ekins (2006: 55). In this model, the carbon tax is modelled as 
0.43p/kWh for electricity and 0.19p/kWh for gas.
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not only on downstream energy prices but also on all other goods and 
services owing to the higher price of the energy used in their production. 
To the extent that they achieve greater emissions coverage, upstream 
mitigation policies are therefore likely to have additional regressive 
effects. For indirect emissions comprise a considerable share of house-
holds’ overall emissions, in some cases more than 50% (Druckman and 
Jackson, 2009: 2074; Reinders et al., 2003) whilst overall expenditure 
including consumer goods generally increases less than proportionally 
with income (see, for example, ONS, 2009, table A9, for the UK case).
However, several studies claim that upstream mitigation policies 
will have weaker regressive effects than downstream policies if com-
panies that are targeted in the upstream policies are less able to pass 
on the price increase directly to consumers (e.g. Baranzini et al., 2000; 
Wier et al., 2005).
Various studies state that regressive effects of environmental 
taxes can be reduced or avoided if the tax is designed progressively, 
putting a lower burden on low income households (e.g. Baranzini 
et al., 2000). Frequently cited examples are the tax-free electricity 
allowance in the Netherlands, 1996–2001, and a progressive water 
charge system in Portugal (Ekins, 1999; Ekins and Barker, 2001; 
Wier et al., 2005). However, several authors argue that environ-
mental policies will be more effective if distributional aspects are 
dealt with separately (e.g. Johnstone and Serret, 2006: 5; Metcalf and 
Weisbach, 2009).
The main exception to the general rule of regressivity seems to be 
measures to reduce emissions from transport. For example, studies that 
concentrate on taxes on personal transport show progressive, inequality-
reducing effects if the whole population is included (Dresner and Ekins, 
2004; Klinge Jacobsen et al., 2003; Tiezzi, 2005; Wier et al., 2005). 
The reason for this is that poorer households fly less than richer house-
holds and are less likely to own a car. However, there is also evidence 
that motoring taxes are regressive amongst motorists. For low income 
households spend a much higher share of their income on motoring 
fuels than high income households (e.g. Dresner and Ekins, 2004). In 
addition, the distributional effects of motoring taxes are influenced by 
the level of public transport provision within regions and countries. 
For example, studies using data from the United States report regres-
sive effects of motoring taxes even if the whole population is included, 
because of high car dependency (Wadud et al., 2008; Walls and 
Hanson, 1999).
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Impact of methodological choices
The distributional effects of climate change mitigation policies pre-
sented in different studies also depend on several methodological 
choices, for example the type of measurement of distributional effects 
and whether or not behavioural responses are included in the model.
Measuring distributional effects. Studies that measure distributional 
effects as a share of annual disposable income tend to show greater 
regressive effects than studies that report shares of current expendi-
ture, which is often used as a proxy for lifetime income (e.g. Burtraw 
et al., 2009; Johnstone and Serret, 2006; Klinge Jacobsen et al., 2003; 
Metcalf, 1999; Wier et al., 2005). This is because expenditure is more 
evenly distributed across households than income.4
Behavioural responses. Models estimating distributional effects of 
emission reduction policies can either be static or include behavioural 
responses. Static models simply estimate the distribution of the finan-
cial burden resulting from mitigation policies, assuming constant 
levels of consumption. Behavioural models also estimate the distribu-
tion of financial burdens but include estimates of changes in people’s 
consumption behaviour in response to price increases. Those estimates 
are often based on ‘price elasticities of demand’ obtained from data on 
responses of consumption to price changes. The demand for goods and 
services is inelastic if demand does not significantly respond to prices 
changes – this is mostly true for ‘essential’ goods that cannot be replaced 
with cheaper equivalents, particularly for low income households. For 
example, Roberts et al. (1999) have argued that car use would decrease 
most in urban areas by low income households and be most inelastic in 
rural areas with poor public transport infrastructures in response to an 
increase in fuel duties.
Several authors argue that regressive effects of climate change 
mitigation policies tend to be overstated if behavioural responses are 
not taken into account (e.g. Johnstone and Serret, 2006; West and 
Williams, 2002). This can be explained by findings that high income 
households respond less to price changes (increases) than low income 
households (e.g. Brand and Boardman, 2008; Cornwell and Creedy, 
1997: 599; Roberts et al., 1999: 283). If this is the case, regressive 
effects will appear weaker in models that include behavioural responses 
than those that do not. For the expenditure of low income households 
will be more responsive to the introduction of a carbon price than that 
of high income households, thereby weakening the estimated finan-
cial impact of higher prices on low income households (e.g. Labandeira 
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et al., 2009; Tiezzi, 2005). However, this purely financial perspective 
disguises wider fairness implications as we noted in the introduction as 
it can be argued that poorer households will experience greater reduc-
tions in terms of their broader well-being than rich households if behav-
ioural responses are taken into account. For example, poorer households 
may have to reduce spatial heating and travel and consume less whilst 
rich households would have the option to pay a higher price to maintain 
their living standards.
Using the revenues from mitigation policies
The distributional outcomes of mitigation policies also crucially depend 
on how the revenues are used and distributed. Revenues arise, for exam-
ple, through carbon taxes or if emission permits within trading schemes 
are (partly) auctioned. Four options are salient in the literature, though 
such options could also be combined in different proportions.
1) If the revenue from mitigation policies is not earmarked for 
direct redistribution to citizens, those policies are highly likely to 
have regressive effects as shown above, perhaps with the exception of 
schemes that only include transport emissions.
2) Governments can earmark the revenue from mitigation policies 
to finance measures that further reduce greenhouse gas emissions or 
support behavioural adaptation. For example energy efficiency meas-
ures such as home insulation programmes, investments into renewable 
energy or public transport subsidies, training, and research and devel-
opment can be supported.
The distributional effects depend on who is benefiting from those 
programmes. For example, means-tested home insulation programmes 
like the Warm Front programme in the UK benefit low income house-
holds, and subsidies for public transport currently primarily benefit 
low income urban households. Policies that aim to expand renewable 
energy, in contrast, can have regressive effects if they work through 
financial incentives to (already wealthy) homeowners. This has been 
a controversial aspect of feed-in tariffs for solar electricity (Monbiot 
2010).
3) The revenue from taxes or auctions under cap and trade schemes 
can be fully redistributed to the population and/or industry. There 
are several options for doing this, which have different distribu-
tional consequences. The first option is frequently discussed in the 
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environmental economics literature in relation to the ‘double divi-
dend’ hypothesis of ‘green taxes’. That is, scholars typically argue 
that the tax creates incentives to reduce the activities that give rise 
to ‘negative externalities’ such as pollution, and that the revenue 
generated can be ‘recycled’ for any other purpose, including the reduc-
tion of taxes on income or capital. If we return to our example on 
petrol, not only would the tax set an incentive for customers to buy less 
petrol, but the raised revenue could be used to offset other tax burdens, 
for example income tax. From a mainstream economics perspective, 
this would limit market distortions that those taxes might imply, for 
example reduced work incentives. If the entire revenue is earmarked to 
decrease/remove other taxes, the tax reform is termed ‘revenue neutral’, 
meaning that the costs of the new source of revenue are completely 
compensated through the reduction of other taxes or charges.
Studies on the effects of reducing social security contributions, 
taxes on income, or VAT so far show mixed results. A study on the Ger-
man ‘eco tax’ demonstrated that the reduction of the contribution to 
pension insurance actually increased the regressive effect as the reduc-
tion mainly benefited middle income households but disadvantaged 
low income, unemployed and pensioner households (Bach et al., 2002; 
Bork, 2006).
A reduction of income tax can be designed in a progressive way 
which decreases taxes on low incomes more than on higher incomes. 
It therefore has tended to have progressive effects in practice according 
to a range of studies (e.g. Grainger and Kolstad, 2008; Metcalf, 1999; 
Metcalf and Weisbach, 2009) (an exception is Burtraw et al., 2009). 
Labandeira et al.’s (2009) study of a revenue-neutral reduction of VAT 
as a compensating mechanism also showed progressive effects. The sec-
ond option is for the revenue to be returned to citizens by increasing 
specific social security benefits, for example child benefit or means-
tested benefits such as tax credits or income support. With this option, 
regressive effects can be considerably reduced or even reversed as several 
studies have demonstrated (Baranzini et al., 2000; Dresner and Ekins, 
2006; Ekins and Barker, 2001; Ekins and Dresner, 2004).
4) A final option is to return the revenue from mitigation poli-
cies directly to individuals or households as a lump sum. There is a 
substantial literature discussing this option (Barker and Köhler, 1998; 
CEC, 1992; Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Ekins and Barker, 2001; Parry, 
2004; West and Williams, 2002). In the United States, a ‘carbon tax 
and 100% dividend’ proposal has recently been promoted by climate 
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scientist James Hansen (2009). An equal per capita rebate or free allo-
cation of emission permits (which is distributionally equivalent) is also 
integral to Personal Carbon Trading (PCT) (DEFRA, 2008a), Cap and 
Share and Cap and Dividend schemes (Barnes, 2003; FEASTA, 2008). 
Under PCT, individuals receive equal per capita tradable carbon allow-
ances. Under Cap and Dividend, an independent climate trust would 
auction off the permits to upstream fossil fuel producers or importers and 
redistribute equal per capita rebates to the citizens. Under Cap and Share, 
an independent trust would allocate each citizen with an equal share of 
the nation’s emission permits which they can then sell via banks or 
post offices. Fossil fuel producers or importers would have to buy the 
permits to cover the carbon content of the products that they intend to 
sell on the market.
Studies that examined the distributional effects of equal per cap-
ita rebates usually conclude that this option has strongly progressive 
effects on average (AEA and Cambridge Econometrics, 2008; Barker 
and Köhler, 1998; DEFRA, 2008a; Dinan and Rogers, 2002; Parry, 
2004; Starkey and Anderson, 2005). This means that low income 
households will gain more (lose less) as a share of their income than 
high income households. For example, in a Cap and Share or Cap and 
Dividend scheme, any individual who consumes less than the capped 
level of emissions will financially gain from the rebate/revenue (AEA 
and Cambridge Econometrics, 2008; Boyce and Riddle, 2007). As low 
income households usually generate relatively low emissions, they may 
gain from the scheme. Even if gains were equal across the income dis-
tribution, it would be larger as a share of income for poorer than for 
richer households. If poorer households gain more in absolute terms 
than richer households, the distributional effect will be strongly pro-
gressive in relative terms. However, as we will see in the following 
section, those findings are complicated by a range of additional socio-
economic characteristics and dynamic considerations.
The distributional effects of lump-sum rebate schemes also depend 
on the level of the cap. PCT or Cap and Share/Dividend schemes will 
be progressive as long as low income households generally consume 
less than their initial allocation of emissions/energy. If a scheme applies 
internationally with the same per capita allocation across the whole 
scheme, its distributional effects are likely to be regressive in highly 
developed countries. For example, a global scheme that allocated a 
budget of 4 tonnes of CO
2
 per year to each citizen in 2006, slightly 
below the then world average of 4.39 tonnes of CO
2
 per person, would 
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have regressive effects in most industrialized countries as their average 
per capita emissions are much higher (in the UK, annual per capita 
emissions were 9.37 tonnes CO
2
, in the US 19 tonnes CO
2
 in 2006).5 
However, those schemes would be extremely progressive in less devel-
oped countries. See Wakeford (2008) and Sharan (2008) on the impact 
of a Cap and Share scheme on South Africa and India respectively.
Socio-demographic factors
The previous section was confined to a consideration of the distribu-
tional effects of mitigation policies across income bands. Whilst this 
is a key dimension of distributional effects, there are a range of addi-
tional socio-economic characteristics which are important. The burdens 
(and benefits) of mitigation policies are unequally distributed across 
dimensions such as household size, type of dwelling, urban/rural loca-
tion and so on. An analysis of distributional effects that only focuses on 
income groups disguises considerable variations of the distribution of 
burdens and benefits within income groups, because of such additional 
factors. Various studies confirm this insight. For example, Dresner and 
Ekins (2006: 52) report that the correlation between income and emis-
sions is actually relatively low (see also Cohen et al., 2005; Hills, 2009; 
Vringer and Blok, 1995). Several studies also report that even with full 
and equal per capita revenue recycling, that is an equal per capita pay-
ment to all citizens financed through the revenue from the emissions 
reduction policy, a substantial proportion of low income households 
would still lose out under such a scheme (DEFRA, 2008a: 3; Dresner 
and Ekins, 2004: 4; 2006: 55). Estimates of this proportion range up 
to 30%.6 An analysis of the role of a wider range of socio-economic 
characteristics is therefore important to uncover and understand the 
variation of distributional effects within income groups. Those varia-
tions are linked to issues of fairness which have to be taken into account 
by policy-makers.
Several mitigation studies examine such characteristics (e.g. 
DEFRA, 2008a; Dresner and Ekins, 2006; Klinge Jacobsen et al., 2003; 
Labandeira et al., 2009; Tiezzi, 2005; Wier et al., 2005). A consistent 
(if predictable) finding is that, in addition to income or expenditure, 
household size is very important: the larger the number of household 
members the higher the emissions. However, if emissions are measured 
per capita, emissions decrease with household size owing to economies 
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of scale (e.g. Baiocchi et al., 2010; DEFRA, 2008a; Wier et al., 2005). 
The trend towards smaller household sizes is therefore a driving factor 
behind increasing per capita emissions in many rich countries, particu-
larly if indirect emissions are included (Druckman and Jackson, 2008: 
3184).
Most studies also conclude that the type of dwelling has a key 
effect on household emissions. The more ‘separated’ and less insu-
lated a dwelling is, the more energy is required for heating. Large, 
detached bungalows are therefore on average the dwelling with highest 
emissions whilst emissions on average decrease across detached, semi-
detached, terraced houses and flats (DEFRA, 2008a; Druckman and 
Jackson, 2008).
Other socio-economic factors are also significant but the literature 
is less conclusive regarding their overall effects. Consider location, for 
example. Whilst rural households have on average higher emissions 
(and therefore higher burdens from mitigation policies), there are dif-
ferent possible reasons for this. DEFRA (2008a: 4) claims, for example, 
that less access to mains gas (which has lower emissions per energy unit 
than any other fossil fuel) and less well insulated houses in rural areas 
are the main reasons for higher rural emissions, rather than greater 
dependency on cars. Whilst it is unclear whether higher rural emissions 
are also partly driven by higher incomes, it is obvious that low income 
households residing in rural areas are likely to bear higher than average 
burdens from mitigation policies even if the revenues are recycled to 
low income households.
Some studies also find effects for the age of the household representa-
tive7 person and their employment status. Here, most studies report that 
households in which the representative is aged 30–65 have higher emis-
sions than households in which they are younger or older. Households 
with ‘economically inactive’8 representatives (for example lone parents, 
unemployed people or pensioners) are also generally estimated to have 
low emissions (Brand and Preston, 2010; Druckman and Jackson, 2008).
This reflects the fact that people in those groups are dispropor-
tionately affected by poverty, resulting in low levels of consumption. 
However, some studies stated that from home energy use, pensioner 
households have comparatively high emissions as pensioners often live 
in large family homes (‘over-occupation’), spend a large share of the 
day at home with their heating switched on and generally have higher 
warmth requirements than average households (e.g. Baiocchi et al., 
2010; DEFRA, 2008a; Tindale and Hewett, 1999).
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So far, relatively few studies use multivariate regression analysis 
to examine the relative impact of different socio-economic factors 
(Baiocchi et al., 2010; Brand and Preston, 2010; DEFRA, 2008a; Lenzen 
et al., 2006; Weber and Matthews, 2008). A comparison of those stud-
ies demonstrates some similarities but also considerable differences 
depending on the model (independent and dependent variables, type 
of regression model) and country. Three studies examining the relative 
impact of different variables on household energy requirements (Lenzen 
et al., 2006: 192) or CO
2
 emissions (Baiocchi et al., 2010: 63; Weber 
and Matthews, 2008: 384) found that expenditure or income was the 
most significant variable with positive effects on the dependent vari-
able. Lenzen et al. (2006: 192) and Baiocchi et al. (2010: 63) also found 
that age had a positive significant effect. However, income had a less 
significant impact on household emissions than the number of adults, 
number of vehicles or central heating type in DEFRA’s study (2008a: 
31), demonstrating again that distributional effects can vary consid-
erably within income brackets and that additional policies might be 
required to tackle those unequal effects.
An interesting contrast appears in Brand and Preston’s (2010: 
17) study on individual emissions from personal travel. In their 
study, pension age had a highly negative effect on emissions. Low 
income was still significant with a negative effect whilst high income 
was not significant at the 0.05 level, compared to middle income 
households.
Conclusions
The literature exhibits a broad consensus that climate change mitiga-
tion policies usually have regressive effects in the absence of compen-
satory revenue recycling. However, it also suggests that exceptions 
exist to this rule. Policies that target personal transport are usually 
progressive. Study results are often influenced by the choice of coun-
try as climatic conditions, energy efficiency of the housing stock, level 
of car-ownership, public transport infrastructure, levels of poverty 
and income inequality and so on all make a difference to potential 
distributional effects. Study results also depend on methodological 
choices, such as the measure that is used to examine distributional 
effects and whether or not behavioural responses are included in the 
model.
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The most effective measures to counteract regressive outcomes 
seem to be lump-sum revenue recycling schemes. However, there are 
several issues related to this which require further debate and research:
i. The literature indicates that, for a variety of reasons, there will still be 
a substantial proportion of lower income losers owing to high direct 
or indirect fossil fuel energy use under lump-sum recycling arrange-
ments. Further research is required to identify the characteristics of 
low income groups at risk of losing out under lump-sum recycling 
arrangements.9
ii Further compensatory policy options may be required to help households 
making a transition to low-impact lifestyles, including home insulation, 
microgeneration as well as public transport programmes. However, addi-
tional research is required to examine the distributional effects of these 
programmes.
iii. Whilst lump-sum rebates are likely to attract wide public support, 
they are likely to be opposed by (high emitting) wealthier people 
and businesses. In addition, in times of financial austerity, govern-
ments may be keen to use revenues from mitigation policies for pur-
poses other than compensating low income households.10 The barriers 
emerging from power asymmetries as well as economic and political 
contexts to adopting effective mitigation policies need to be further 
investigated.
iv. Public support for lump-sum recycling climate change mitigation 
schemes is likely to disappear completely in rich countries such as the 
UK if such schemes are introduced at an international scale and if the 
annual per capita allowance is lower than the annual emission tonnage 
of even the lowest income households. This is because international 
equal allowance and lump-sum rebate schemes would be regressive in 
rich countries, and trigger an enormous transfer of resources from the 
developed to the less developed world. Policy options of mitigating 
those effects need to be further investigated. One possibility could be 
the application of ‘contraction and convergence’ (Meyer, 2000) frame-
works which envisage equal per capita allowances at a later point in 
time, thus implying less immediate redistributions between rich and 
poor nations.
v. Finally, a key issue which so far appears to have been relatively neglected 
in the literature on distributional effects is the dynamic aspect of the 
climate change mitigation challenge. Politicians have tended to focus on 
emissions reduction targets of the form ‘x% by year Y’, such as the UK’s 
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current 80% emissions reduction by 2050 target. Climate researchers 
have in contrast called for finite greenhouse gas budgets, implying a steep 
trajectory for emissions reductions, and thus net-emissions11 budgets that 
reduce rapidly year on year until they approach zero (Anderson and Bows, 
2008). Of course, revenue can only arise from carbon reduction policies as 
long as there are emissions left that can be reduced – once net-emissions 
have reached zero, the revenue stream from those policies will run dry. 
Thus, any dividend from mitigation policy would have to be seen as a 
temporary palliative aiding the shift to a transformed, zero net-emissions 
economy, rather than as a permanent resource of social policy. A research 
issue arising here is whether measures to mitigate regressivity will ulti-
mately, therefore, be more effective if they provide benefits in kind, help-
ing people to make practical transitions towards a low carbon future, 
rather than income alone.
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Notes
 1. The article is based on an extensive review of the literature published 
between the late 1990s and April 2010, including 53 journal articles, 
book chapters, working papers and government agency reports pub-
lished in English. Of the 53 articles covered in this article, 6 exam-
ined the UK, 30 analysed other OECD countries (primarily the USA), 
4 focussed on non-OECD countries, 9 compared several countries and 
4 focussed based on theoretical models. Owing to space constraints we 
cannot include citations to all the literature we reviewed.
 2. This may also be related to the general dissatisfaction amongst policy-
makers with central planning following the economic demise of the 
Soviet bloc in the 1990s.
 3. Klinge Jacobsen et al. (2003: 494) argue that electricity and water can be 
‘luxury goods’ in developing countries with lower income groups consum-
ing much less of those goods than higher income groups. This is likely to 
make electricity and water taxation progressive in those countries.
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 4. It should be noted here that distributional effects of mitigation policies 
are sometimes also assessed using Lorenz curves, the Gini coefficient 
or other measures of distributive inequality. Those studies compare the 
degree of income inequality before and after a mitigation policy had 
been introduced. An increase in income inequality means that a mitiga-
tion policy has regressive effects and vice versa (e.g. Barros and Prieto-
Rodriguez, 2008; Klinge Jacobsen et al., 2003).
 5. These are the latest available data. Source: World Bank Development 
Indicators, available at http://data.worldbank.org/topic/environment
 6. However, studies on the distribution of emissions usually rely on 
expenditure surveys. The quality of those surveys is usually affected by 
the ‘infrequency of purchase’ problem as they only cover brief expendi-
ture periods of individual households. Whilst over- or under-estimation 
of expenditure is likely to even out within large datasets, the dispersion 
around the mean will be biased. This also applies to individual income 
deciles. Hence, estimates regarding the proportion of low income people 
who stand to lose or win from a policy package need to be treated with 
caution.
 7. Most of those studies are based on household income or other meas-
ures mainly because of lack of data at the individual level. Estimating 
distributional effects at the household level is naturally limited as it 
does not take different levels of individual emissions and related distri-
butional effects of mitigation policies within households into account. 
For example, it would be interesting to investigate gender differences 
within households. Studies that are based on single households suggest 
that men eat more meat and drive longer distances than women and may 
therefore be responsible for a larger proportion of household emissions 
than women (Räty and Carlsson-Kanyama, 2010).
 8. The statistical classification of ‘economically inactive’ of course neglects 
the unpaid work with which people in this category contribute to the 
economy, particularly the unpaid and therefore marginalized care-work 
by lone parents and other carers.
 9. This is a question that we, Milena Büchs, Sylke Schnepf and Nicholas 
Bardsley, will address in our project on ‘Who emits most? An analysis 
of UK households’ CO
2
 emissions and their association with socio-
economic factors’ (ESRC RES-000-22-4083) starting in May 2011.
10. Such mistrust in government has led several advocacy organizations to 
propose delegation of decisions on emission reduction targets as well as 
redistribution of lump sums to an independent trust (e.g. Barnes, 2003; 
FEASTA, 2008).
11. Any residual carbon emissions occurring in such an economy would need 
to be counter-balanced through carbon sequestration or capture which 
remove equivalent amounts of carbon from the atmosphere.
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
302 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 1 ( 2 )
References
AEA and Cambridge Econometrics (2008) ‘A Study in Personal Carbon Allo-
cation: Cap and Share’, a report to Comhar SDC Sustainable Develop-
ment Council, Ireland. AEA Energy & Environment and Cambridge 
Econometrics. [http://www.feasta.org/documents/energy/Comhar_Cap_
and_Share_Report.pdf], accessed 19 January 2009.
Anderson, K. and Bows, A. (2008) ‘Reframing the Climate Change Challenge in 
Light of Post-2000 Emission Trends’, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences 366(1882): 3863–82.
Bach, S., Kohlhaas, M., Meyer, B., Praetorius, B. and Welsch, H. (2002) 
‘The Effects of Environmental Fiscal Reform in Germany: A Simulation 
Study’, Energy Policy 30(9): 803–11.
Baiocchi, G., Minx, J. and Hubacek, K. (2010) ‘The Impact of Social Fac-
tors and Consumer Behavior on Carbon Dioxide Emissions in the United 
Kingdom’, Journal of Industrial Ecology 14(1): 50–72.
Baranzini, A., Goldemberg, J. and Speck, S. (2000) ‘A Future for Carbon 
Taxes’, Ecological Economics 32(3): 395–412.
Barker, T. and Köhler, J. (1998) ‘Equity and Ecotax Reform in the EU: 
Achieving a 10 Per Cent Reduction in CO
2
 Emissions Using Excise 
Duties’, Fiscal Studies 19(4): 375–402.
Barnes, P. (2003) Who Owns the Sky? Our Common Assets and the Future of Capi-
talism. Washington DC: Island Press.
Barros, C. P. and Prieto-Rodriguez, J. (2008) ‘A Revenue-Neutral Tax 
Reform to Increase Demand for Public Transport Services’, Transportation 
Research Part A: Policy and Practice 42(4): 659–72.
Bork, C. (2006) ‘Distributional Effects of the Ecological Tax Reform in Ger-
many: An Evaluation with a Microsimulation Model’, pp. 139–70 in Y. 
Serret and N. Johnstone (eds) The Distributional Effects of Environmental 
Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar / OECD.
Boyce, J. and Riddle, M. (2007) ‘Cap and Dividend: How to Curb Global 
Warming While Protecting the Incomes of American Families’, Work-
ing Paper Series Number 150. Amherst: Political Economy Research 
Institute, University of Massachusetts.
Brand, C. and Boardman, B. (2008) ‘Taming of the Few: The Unequal Dis-
tribution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Personal Travel in the UK’, 
Energy Policy 36(1): 224–38.
Brand, C. and Preston, J. M. (2010) ‘“60-20 Emission”: The Unequal Distri-
bution of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Personal, Non-business Travel 
in the UK’, Transport Policy 17(1): 9–19.
Bristow, A. L., Wardman, M., Zanni, A. M. and Chintakayala, P. K. (2010) 
‘Public Acceptability of Personal Carbon Trading and Carbon Tax’, Eco-
logical Economics 69(9): 1824–37.
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
 B Ü C H S  E T  A L .—WHO  B E A R S  T H E  B R U N T ?  303
Burtraw, D., Sweeney, R. and Walls, M. (2009) ‘The Incidence of U.S. Cli-
mate Policy: Alternative Uses of Revenues from a Cap-and-Trade Auc-
tion’, National Tax Journal 62: 497–518.
CEC (1992) ‘European Economy: The Climate Challenge – Economic Aspects 
of the Community’s Strategy for Limiting CO
2
 Emissions’, European 
Economy 51, Commission of the European Communities. Luxembourg: 
Office for Official Publications.
Cohen, C., Lenzen, M. and Schaeffer, R. (2005) ‘Energy Requirements of 
Households in Brazil’, Energy Policy 33(4): 555–62.
Cornwell, A. and Creedy, J. (1997) ‘Measuring the Welfare Effects of Tax 
Changes Using the LES: An Application to a Carbon Tax’, Empirical Eco-
nomics 22(4): 589–613.
DEFRA (2008a) ‘Distributional Impacts of Personal Carbon Trading’. March. 
London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. [http://
www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/individual/carbon-
trading/pdf/pct-distributional-impacts.pdf], accessed 1 July 2008.
DEFRA (2008b) ‘Personal Carbon Trading: Public Acceptability’, March. 
London: Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs.
Dinan, T. and Rogers, D. L. (2002) ‘Distributional Effects of Carbon Allow-
ance Trading: How Government Decisions Determine Winners and Los-
ers’, National Tax Journal 55(2): 199–221.
Dresner, S. and Ekins, P. (2004) ‘The Distributional Impacts of Economic 
Instruments to Limit Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Transport’, PSI 
Research Discussion Paper 19. London: Policy Studies Institute.
Dresner, S. and Ekins, P. (2006) ‘Economic Instruments to Improve UK 
Home Energy Efficiency without Negative Social Impacts’, Fiscal Studies 
27(1): 47–74.
Druckman, A. and Jackson, T. (2008) ‘Household Energy Consumption in 
the UK: A Highly Geographically and Socio-economically Disaggre-
gated Model’, Energy Policy 36(8): 3177–92.
Druckman, A. and Jackson, T. (2009) ‘The Carbon Footprint of UK House-
holds 1990–2004: A Socio-economically Disaggregated, Quasi-Multi-
Regional Input-Output Model’, Ecological Economics 68(7): 2066–77.
Ekins, P. (1999) ‘European Environmental Taxes and Charges: Recent Expe-
rience, Issues and Trends’, Ecological Economics 31: 39–62.
Ekins, P. and Barker, T. (2001) ‘Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trad-
ing’, Journal of Economic Surveys 15(3): 325–76.
Ekins, P. and Dresner, S. (2004) ‘Green Taxes and Charges: Reducing their 
Impact on Low-income Households’. York: Joseph Rowntree Founda-
tion. [http://www.jrf.org.uk/sites/files/jrf/1859352472.pdf], accessed 18 
March 2009.
FEASTA (2008) ‘Cap & Share: A Fair Way to Cut Greenhouse Emissions’. 
Dublin: The Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability (FEASTA). 
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
304 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 1 ( 2 )
[http://www.feasta.org/documents/energy/Cap-and-Share-May08.pdf], 
accessed 4 July 2008.
Fleming, D. (2007) ‘Energy and the Common Purpose: Descending the 
Energy Staircase with Tradable Energy Quotas (TEQs)’. London: The 
Lean Economy Connection.
Gough, I., Meadowcroft, J., Dryzek, J., Gerhards, J., Lengfeld, H., Markan-
dya, A. and Ortiz, R. (2008) ‘JESP Symposium: Climate Change and 
Social Policy’, Journal of European Social Policy 18(4): 325–44.
Grainger, C. and Kolstad, C. (2008) ‘Who Pays for a Carbon Tax?’, Uni-
versity of California (conference paper). [http://stanford.edu/dept/france-
stanford/Conferences/Climate/Kolstad.pdf], accessed 30 March 2009.
Hansen, J. E. (2009) ‘Carbon Tax & 100% Dividend’. Testimony of James 
E. Hansen to Committee on Ways and Means, United States House of 
Representatives, 25 February. [http://www.columbia.edu/~jeh1/2009/
WaysAndMeans_20090225.pdf], accessed 22 July 2009.
Helm, D. (2005) Climate-Change Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hills, J. (2009) ‘Future Pressures: Intergenerational Links, Wealth, Demog-
raphy and Sustainability’, pp. 319–40 in J. Hills, T. Sefton and K. Stew-
art (eds) Towards a More Equal Society? Poverty, Inequality and Policy since 
1997. Bristol: Policy Press.
Johnstone, N. and Serret, Y. (2006) ‘Distributional Effects of Environmental 
Policy: Introduction’, pp. 1–19 in Y. Serret and N. Johnstone (eds) The Dis-
tributional Effects of Environmental Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar / OECD.
Klinge Jacobsen, H., Birr-Pedersen, K. and Wier, M. (2003) ‘Distributional 
Implication of Environmental Taxation in Denmark’, Fiscal Studies 24(4): 
477–99.
Labandeira, X., Labeaga, J. M. and Rodriguez, M. (2009) ‘An Integrated 
Economic and Distributional Analysis of Energy Policies’, Energy Policy 
37(12): 5776–86.
Lenzen, M., Wier, M., Cohen, C., Hayami, H., Pachauri, S. and Schaeffer, 
R. (2006) ‘A Comparative Multivariate Analysis of Household Energy 
Requirements in Australia, Brazil, Denmark, India and Japan’, Energy 
31(2–3): 181–207.
Metcalf, G. E. (1999) ‘A Distributional Analysis of Green Tax Reforms’, 
National Tax Journal 52(4): 655–81.
Metcalf, G. E. and Weisbach, D. (2009) ‘The Design of a Carbon Tax’, Har-
vard Environmental Law Review 33(2): 499–556.
Meyer, A. (2000) Contraction and Convergence: The Global Solution to Climate 
Change. Totnes: Green Books.
Michaelowa, A. and Butzengeiger, S. (2005) ‘EU Emissions Trading: Navi-
gating between Scylla and Charybdis’, Climate Policy 5(1): 1–9.
Monbiot, G. (2010) ‘Are We Really Going to Let Ourselves Be Duped into 
this Solar Panel Rip-off?’, The Guardian 1 March.
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
 B Ü C H S  E T  A L .—WHO  B E A R S  T H E  B R U N T ?  305
OECD (1994) Managing the Environment: The Role of Economic Instruments. 
Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD).
ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2009) Family Spending: A Report on the 
2008 Living Costs and Food Survey. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Parry, I. W. H. (2004) ‘Are Emissions Permits Regressive?’, Journal of Envi-
ronmental Economics and Management 47(2): 364–87.
Räty, R. and Carlsson-Kanyama, A. (2010) ‘Energy Consumption by Gender 
in Some European Countries’, Energy Policy 38(1): 646–9.
Reinders, A. H. M. E., Vringer, K. and Blok, K. (2003) ‘The Direct and Indi-
rect Energy Requirement of Households in the European Union’, Energy 
Policy 31(2): 139–53.
Roberts, D., Farrington, J., Gray, D. and Martin, S. (1999) ‘The Distribu-
tional Effects of Fuel Duties: The Impact on Rural Households in Scot-
land’, Regional Studies 33(3): 281–8.
Serret, Y. and Johnstone, N. (2006) The Distributional Effects of Environmental 
Policy. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar / OECD.
Shammin, M. R. and Bullard, C. W. (2009) ‘Impact of Cap-and-Trade Poli-
cies for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions on US Households’, Ecologi-
cal Economics 68(8–9): 2432–8.
Sharan, A. (2008) ‘Potential Impacts of a Global Cap and Share Scheme on 
India’. Dublin: FEASTA. [http://www.capandshare.org/download_files/
C&S_India_report.pdf], accessed 23 March 2009.
Sijm, J., Neuhoff, K. and Chen, Y. (2006) ‘CO
2
 Cost Pass-Through and 
Windfall Profits in the Power Sector’, Climate Policy 6(1): 49–72.
Starkey, R. and Anderson, K. (2005) ‘Domestic Tradable Quotas: A Policy 
Instrument for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Energy Use’. 
Technical Report 39. Norwich: Tyndall Centre for Climate Change 
Research.
Tickell, O. (2008) Kyoto2: How to Manage the Global Greenhouse. London: Zed 
Books.
Tiezzi, S. (2005) ‘The Welfare Effects and the Distributive Impact of Carbon 
Taxation on Italian Households’, Energy Policy 33(12): 1597–612.
Tindale, S. and Hewett, C. (1999) ‘Must the Poor Pay More? Sustainable 
Development, Social Justice, and Environmental Taxation’, pp. 233–48 
in A. Dobson (ed.) Fairness and Futurity: Essays on Environmental Sustain-
ability and Social Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Vringer, K. and Blok, K. (1995) ‘The Direct and Indirect Energy 
Requirements of Households in the Netherlands’, Energy Policy 23(10):
893–910.
Wadud, Z., Noland, R. B. and Graham, D. J. (2008) ‘Equity Analysis of 
Personal Tradable Carbon Permits for the Road Transport Sector’, Envi-
ronmental Science & Policy 11(6): 533–44.
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
306 C R I T I C A L  S O C I A L  P O L I C Y  3 1 ( 2 )
Wakeford, J. (2008) ‘Potential Impacts of a Global Cap and Share Scheme 
on South Africa’. Dublin: FEASTA. [http://www.capandshare.org/down-
load_files/C&S_South_Africa_report.pdf], accessed 23 March 2009.
Walls, M. and Hanson, J. (1999) ‘Distributional Aspects of an Environmen-
tal Tax Shift: The Case of Motor Vehicle Emissions Taxes’, National Tax 
Journal 52(1): 53–65.
Weber, C. L. and Matthews, H. S. (2008) ‘Quantifying the Global and Dis-
tributional Aspects of American Household Carbon Footprint’, Ecological 
Economics 66(2–3): 379–91.
West, S. E. and Williams, R. C. (2002) ‘Estimates from a Consumer Demand 
System: Implications for the Incidence of Environmental Taxes’, Work-
ing Paper 9152. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
[http://www.macalester.edu/~wests/NBER9152.pdf]
Wier, M., Birr-Pedersen, K., Jacobsen, H. K. and Klok, J. (2005) ‘Are CO
2
 
Taxes Regressive? Evidence from the Danish Experience’, Ecological
Economics 52(2): 239–51.
  Milena Büchs is lecturer in sociology and social policy at the University 
of Southampton. Her current research focuses on household CO
2
 emissions 
and inequality (ESRC) and the role of third sector organizations in promot-
ing low carbon practices (ESRC-funded Third Sector Research Centre). She 
has previously worked and published on European Union social policy and 
social policy governance, including ‘How legitimate is the Open Method 
of Coordination?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2008, 46(4): 765–86; 
‘The Open Method of Coordination: Effectively preventing welfare state 
retrenchment?’, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), 2009, Vol. 13. 
Address: School of Social Sciences, Sociology and Social Policy, University of 
Southampton, Highfield, Southampton SO17 1BJ, UK. email: m.buechs@
soton.ac.uk 
  Nicholas Bardsley is lecturer in climate change economics at the School 
of Agriculture, Policy and Development, University of Reading. His cur-
rent research focuses on household CO
2
 emissions and inequality (ESRC), and 
household energy use (ESRC / EPSRC). He also has a long-standing interest 
in behavioural economics. His recent publications include (with R. Cubitt, 
G. Loomes, P. Moffatt, C. Starmer and R. Sugden), Experimental Economics: 
Rethinking the Rules (Princeton University Press, 2010). 
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
 B Ü C H S  E T  A L .—WHO  B E A R S  T H E  B R U N T ?  307
  Sebastian Duwe is a doctoral student associated with the Environmen-
tal Policy Research Centre (FFU) at the Free University Berlin. His research 
focuses on the governance of the transition to low carbon economies. He holds 
a Bachelor in Political Science from the Free University Berlin and a Master 
of Public Policy degree from the Hertie School of Governance. Besides his 
studies, he works as a freelance consultant for various agencies including the 
German Federal Ministry of Health. 
 at Freie Universitaet Berlin on April 24, 2015csp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
